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THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
SHREDDING THE PAPER CURTAIN
Acquisition of information and control over its dissemination are
the hallmarks of political power. While information control has always
been a strategic concomitant of political power, the pervasiveness of
modem mass media has rendered it invaluable. Thus, the first objective
of any revolutionary force is to gain control of the information-dis-
pensing apparatus. The manner in which information is administered
within a particular society is indicative of the form of government
which exists in that country. Where strict censorship and control of
information exists, an authoritarian government will inevitably reside.
Conversely, where information is freely accessible, representative gov-
ernment flourishes. In the United States, the principle that information
is the currency of power is reflected in the vital issues of the day.1
The government of the United States was established as a govern-
ment "of the people, by the people, for the people."'2 The Founding
Fathers clearly envisioned a government whose primary function was
to benefit those it governed. In order to avoid accumulation of power
within any one branch of government, they established a representative
democracy with sovereign power divided among the Legislature, Execu-
tive and Judiciary.
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the con-
vention of 1787, not to promote efficiency, but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction,
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution
1 Regardless of whether it comes under the guise of news management, the credibility
gap, or government secrecy the basic question at issue is the control of information. The
conflict over who is going to gain information and when it shall be made available arises in
various contexts. A prime example of this problem is the Watergate scandal. In addition to
the alleged concealment of information pertaining to criminal activity within the White
House, the most serious aspects of Watergate revolve around the testimony regarding
domestic surveillance and public opinion manipulation. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1973, at 1,
col. 8. These charges represent serious challenges to our Constitutional structure and will
only be resolved by a complete airing of all the facts.
Questions concerning information and control of its dissemination have been posed to
the courts in a number of cases. The two most significant are the trial of Daniel Ellsberg
and Anthony Russo for releasing the Pentagon Papers, United States v. Russo, Criminal
No. 9373-CD (C.D. Cal., Dec. 29, 1971), and the recent Supreme Court decision holding
that newspapermen do not have a constitutional privilege to withold their sources of in-
formation, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). It should be noted that the charges
against Ellsberg and Russo were subsequently dismissed. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1973, at 1,
col. 8.
These controversies highlight the fundamental constitutional considerations involved
in the use of information and emphasize an unspoken premise of our system: the people
have a right both to receive and to distribute information.
2 Gettysburg Address by Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 19, 1863.
694
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
of the governmental powers among three departments to save the
people from autocracy.3
In order to assure a government of laws and not of men they
embodied their political philosophies into one great document, the
Constitution of the United States. The first principle upon which this
newly-formed government was to function was the basic concept of
accountability. The Founding Fathers realized that only an informed
populace could preserve the principle of accountability and thereby
prevent concentration of power within any one branch. This concept
was profoundly expressed by James Madison:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean
to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power
knowledge gives. A popular government without popular informa-
tion, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce
or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.4
As government regulates daily life to a greater degree, the people's
right to be more dearly informed about the activities and decision-
making processes of government increases proportionately. The emer-
gence of the United States as a world power after World War I, the
Depression, and the subsequent technological and economic expansion
led to greater governmental control and regulation. To meet these
challenges effectively, a hybrid creature of authority evolved, viz,
the administrative agency.
Since these agencies were answerable primarily to the Executive
and were not subject to the normal checks and balances of the three
major branches of government, a problem developed regarding their
lack of accountability. Many agencies were operated like miniature
baronies and developed protective mechanisms in order to frustrate
possible inquiry. In order to eliminate the paper curtain of bureaucracy,
Congress attempted the formulation of a general statutory scheme to
aid free access to knowledge of agency operations by enacting section
three of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).5
Soon after its enactment it became apparent that, despite the
clear intent of Congress, this statute was often being used as a justifica-
3 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, reprinted in 9 THE WRrr-
INGS Or JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910).
5 Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 [hereinafter cited as APA]. The Con.
gressional intent is apparent from the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee:
The section has been drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and
procedures are public property which the general public.., is entitled to know
or to have the ready means of knowing with definiteness and assurance.
S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1945).
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tion for withholding information rather than disclosing it. By its terms,
only persons "properly and directly concerned" could obtain access to
agency files. The right to information was further qualified by provisions
stating that an agency could, under color of law, withhold documents
"in the public interest" or whenever "good cause [for confidentiality]
was found."6 This vague language made the APA susceptible to agency
manipulation 7 and severely hampered the ability of interested parties to
acquire information. Section three of the APA was described by the
Senate Judiciary Committee as "full of loopholes which allow agencies
to deny legitimate information to the public. Innumerable times it
appears that information is withheld only to cover up embarrassing
mistakes or irregularities .. .
The effectiveness of the APA as a public information statute was
severely limited by lack of judicial review. As a result of this deficiency,
an agency refusal to disclose information was, in fact, a final decision.
In addition, the APA, as it pertained to public information, contained
no provision for discovery in the administrative process. The combina-
tion of these factors made the APA unsuitable as a vehicle to secure
information. This conclusion was expressed by the Senate: "The APA
is of little or no value to the public in gaining access to the records of
the Federal Government."9 Although the inadequacies of the APA
were apparent almost from its inception, Congress took eleven years of
debates and hearings10 before it promulgated an acceptable replace-
ment. In 1966, the Freedom of Information Act'- (FOIA) emerged
from this exhaustive process.
The FOIA constitutes a threefold attempt to rectify the most
glaring abuses of the APA. The Act provides that "any person" may
acquire information from an agency, subject to nine exceptions. This
provision eliminated the APA's standing requirement which neces-
sitated a requester to be "properly and directly concerned." In addition,
the FOIA shifted the burden of proof from the requester, as provided
in the APA, to the Government. By virtue of this provision, the
demandant must receive the information unless the agency can justify
6APA § 3.
7 "These four restrictive and nebulously drafted clauses provided agencies and depart-
ments with pervasive means of withholding information." Comment, The Freedom of In-
formation Act: A Critical Review, 38 Gzo. WASH. L. REV. 150, 152 (1969).
SS. REIP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
9 Id. at 5.
10 A compilation of most of the useful legislative history of the FOIA is contained in
the ten page Senate Report and fourteen page House Report. See Davis, The Information
Act: A Preliminary Analysis 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 761, 762 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
115 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as FOIA].
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its nondisclosure; 12 that is, the FOIA creates a presumption in favor
of disclosure.
The final and most significant improvement of the FOIA is the
judicial review provision. The import of this provision was recently
articulated by Congressman Moorhead:
No law is self-enforcing, least of all a law designed to help the
citizen in a contest with the government. Thus, the Freedom of
Information Act has a built-in enforcement tool - the citizen's
right to go to court and force the government to prove the need
to withhold records.13
The Act specifically empowers the federal district courts with "jurisdic-
tion to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order
the production of any agency records improperly withheld .... 14
Contrary to expectations, the integration of the FOIA into the
administrative process has been slow because of several inherent flaws.
Among these is its equivocal draftsmanship."; This would not be an
insurmountable obstacle if the legislative history had provided a suffici-
ent clarification of its nebulous sections. Unfortunately, the legislative
history accompanying the FOIA has created as many problems as it has
solved.
In general, the Senate Report 6 complies with the intent of the
drafters to a greater degree than either the House Report 17 or the At-
torney General's Report.'8 While several courts have judicially noted
that the Senate Report is the surer indication of congressional intent,19
12 S. R . at 8; H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP.].
13 Statement by Congressman William S. Moorhead, Chairman, Foreign Operations and
Government Information Subcommittee, March 19, 1972, reprinted in Hearings on the
Freedom of Information Act Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1844 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Moorhead Hearings].
14 FOIA § 552(a)(3).
15 Davis at 807-09.
lo S. REP., supra note 8.
17 H.R. REP., supra note 12.
18 AToNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECION OF THE
ADMImSrATIVE PRocEDURE Acr (1967) [hereinafter cited as ATr'Y GEN. MIEfo.]. This was
a 47 page booklet compiled by the Justice Department which purported to explain the
FOIA and establish guidelines for agencies.
19 In Benson v. General Servs. Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968),
aff'd on other grounds, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969), Chief Judge Lindberg wrote:
The House Report accompanied the bill on its passage through the House of Rep-
resentatives, after the bill had already passed the Senate.... ["]o the extent that
the tvo reports disagree, the surer indication of congressional intent is to be found
in the Senate Report, which was available for consideration in both houses.
289 F. Supp. at 595 (emphasis added). See also Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 794 (6th Cir.
1972); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Administration, 01 F. Supp.
796, 800-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
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the Justice Department and the agencies have relied on the restrictive
interpretation of the House and the Attorney General. Since the pro-
cedural rules for implementing the FOIA are drawn up by the agencies
themselves20 the interpretation they adopt will determine the practical
operation of the Act.
The ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of the FOIA
is vested in good faith adherence to its principles by administrative
officials. The statute allows a great deal of flexibility and discretion to
the bureaucrat. The necessity for agency cooperation was recognized
by President Johnson who urged "a constructive approach to the word-
ing and spirit and legislative history of this measure.' 21 Further in
order to achieve this goal he instructed "every official in this administra-
tion ... to make information available to the full extent consistent
with individual privacy and with the national interest."22
Five years after its inception the House Subcommittee on Govern-
ment Operations evaluated the operation of the FOIA.23 These hearings
revealed that the most significant shortcomings in the operation of the
FOIA were the result of administrative foot-dragging 4 and widespread
reluctance25 of bureaucracy to honor the public's legal right to know.
The sub-committee concluded:
[N]o changes in law and no directives from agency heads will
necessarily convince any secrecy minded bureaucrat that public
records are public property. Only day-to-day watchfulness by the
Congress and the administration leaders can guarantee the freedom
of government information .... 26
The intricacies of the problems generated by the equivocal draftsman-
20 FOIA § 552(a)(1). See notes 56-60 and accompanying text, infra.
21 Statement by President Johnson upon signing FOIA on July 4, 1966 [hereinafter
cited as Johnson Statement], reprinted in Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1080.
22 Id. See also Arr'Y GEN. MEMO., supra note 18, at iii:
Law is not wholly self-explanatory or self-executing. Its efficacy is heavily depen-
dent on the sound judgment and faithful execution of those who direct and ad-
minister our agencies ....
Id.
23 Moorhead Hearings, supra note 15.
24 Id. at 1332. See also H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited
as GOVERNMENT OPERATiONS REP.]. This report stated that the major agencies took an
average of 33 days to comply with requests for information. Id. at 8. See The Freedom of
Information Analytical Chart, Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1338. See generally
Gianella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: A Proposal
for Uniform Regulations 23 AD. L. REv. 217 (1971) [hereinafted cited as Uniform Proposal].
25 The FOIA's shortcomings are "due . . . to resistance on the part of the huge bu-
rcaucracy . . . ." Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1332. See Testimony of Harrison
Wellford and Peter Schuck, id. at 1253-68. See also note 33 infra.
26 GOVERNMENT OPERAMONs REP. supra note 24, at 9.
[Vol. 47:694
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ship and the contradictory legislative history will become apparent in
the analysis to follow.
APPLICABILITY AND PROCEDURE
In substance the FOIA provides that "any person" may obtain
"identifiable records" from "each agency" pursuant to "published
rules." In the event a request is improperly denied "the district court
shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency
to sustain its action."
Any Person
The words "any person" clearly imply the absence of a standing
requirement as a precondition for disclosure. This phrase means that
"all individuals have equal rights of access . ,,17 However, the ap-
plication of this concept has been obscured by several early FOIA
cases and by certain exceptions later carved out.28
As previously noted, the APA, prior to the FOIA amendment,
required that a party requesting information be "properly and directly
concerned." The FOIA eliminated this section and required that in-
formation be made available to "any person." Unfortunately, several
courts in the early cases29 apparently required the petitioner to estab-
lish his need to know.
However, the need to know requirement could not be justified by
the language of the Act and subsequent cases uniformly rejected such
a requirement. In Getman v. NLRB, °0 Judge Skelly Wright refused to
inquire into the petitioner's need to know. The basis for this position
was expressed in the following manner: "[A]ny discretionary balancing
of competing interests will necessarily be inconsistent with the purpose
of the Act to give agencies, and the courts as well, definitive guidelines
in setting information policies."8 1 A recent Sixth Circuit case, Hawkes
v. IRS,82 illustrates the extent to which the courts have rejected the need
27 ATr'Y GEN. MEMO., supra note 18, at iv.
28 A careful examination reveals that the demandant's need may be considered sub-
ject to the following exceptions: (1) matters involving inter-agency or intra-agency memo-
randa, FOIA § 552(b)(5); see notes 161-73 and accompanying text infra, (2) matters in-
volving a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," id. § 552(b)(6), see note 174
and accompanying text infra, and (3) matters involving "investigatory files," id. § 552(b)(7);
see notes 175-86 and accompanying text infra.
29 Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Bar-
celoneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
80 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971).
31 Id. at 674 n.10.
32 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972). The petitioner had requested the disclosure of certain
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) manuals in order to defend himself in a criminal action for
1973]
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to know approach. In Hawkes, the court held that although the peti-
tioners need had become moot by virtue of a criminal conviction for tax
fraud, the FOIA still applied and, consequently, it remanded for dis-
closure provided there was no exemption applicable. Thus, disclosure,
regardless of the demandant's need, has emerged as the accepted inter-
pretation.33
Identifiable Records
The FOIA requires that records sought be "identifiable." The
meaning of this section was stated in the Senate Report: "The records
must be identifiable by the person requesting them, i.e., a reasonable
description enabling the Government employee to locate the requested
records. '34 Implicit in this section is the requirement that such records
must be presently existing in the form requested.35
While the courts have generally adopted a lenient interpretation
of this requirement, certain requests have been declared unreasonable.
Whether a requested document is arguably "identifiable" is a question
of degree. The most frequent ground for denial is that the records are
not "identifiable" by virtue of their volume. Such a case is Shakespeare
Co. v. United States,30 where the petitioner sought copies of all private
rulings issued by the IRS since 1954. The court denied the request
made pursuant to ordinary discovery procedures and then summarily
rejected the contention that the FOIA would entitle the petitioner to
tax fraud. When his request was denied, he sued under the FOIA for the release of these
documents. Prior to the resolution of the FOIA action, he was convicted and the IRS
moved to dismiss the FOIA suit as moot. See also American Mail Line Ltd. v. Gulick, 411
F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1972). But see
Misegades v. Schulyer, 456 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1972).
As an alternative grounds for dismissal the IRS contended that Hawkes' request should
be denied because he had an adequate remedy at law, viz., the criminal discovery process.
467 F.2d at 790. See note 87-104 and accompanying text infra where the application of
equitable principles to the FOIA is treated.
83 But see Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1237 (statement by Roger C. Cramton,
Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States): "The practical fact is
that every agency official takes into account who the requester is, why he wants the infor-
mation, and what he is going to use it for." Id.
34 S. REP., supra note 8, at 8. Accord, Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
35 See Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969). In this case, the
Seventh Circuit held that the defendant was under no obligation to compile a master list
of information which it had made available to the local boards individually. Although the
denial was based on other grounds, the court said that it could have denied relief because
the records were not "identifiable."
In our computerized society this is somewhat difficult to understand. Nevertheless,
there is no denial that these records are not "identifiable' and consequently the
plaintiff established no right under the statutory language of Section 552.
Id. at 157-58. But see Martin v. Neuschel, 396 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1968).
30 389 F.2d 772 (Ct. Cl. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970).
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the documents sought. In denying this all-inclusive request, the court
held that "the same rules as to identification of the particular docu-
ments sought, as well as materiality.. ." apply to disclosure under
the FOIA as they do under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, lack of specificity is not the only ground for denial. In
Nichols v. United States,38 the plaintiff sought to examine certain three-
dimensional articles related to the assassination of President Kennedy.
Although the "records" were painstakingly identified, the district court
held that they did not constitute "identifiable records." After examin-
ing the statute, the legislative history and other relevant sources without
finding a definitive answer, District Judge Templar took refuge in
Webster's Dictionary and held that "records" meant written docu-
ments.3 9
Although the Act qualifies the records available with the word
"identifiable," Congress was not unaware this phrase might be used as
an excuse for non-disclosure by the agencies. Accordingly, the Senate
Report cautions "[t]his requirement of identification is not to be used
as a method of withholding records." 40 However, in Wellford v.
Hardin,41 that is precisely what the Department of Agriculture at-
tempted to do. The agency created a Catch-22 situation by denying the
petitioner's request for lack of specificity while at the same time deny-
ing a request for the relevant indices on the grounds that they were ex-
empt intra-agency memoranda. The court found that this ploy was
clearly a violation of the FOIA and granted disclosure. The resolution
of this problem illustrates the common-sense approach needed to make
the FOIA an effective vehicle of disclosure. As Chief Judge Bazelon
stated in Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, "When Congress acted to close the
loopholes, it clearly intended to avoid creating new ones. '42
It is clear that the burden of identification lies with the demandant.
However, the agencies should be cognizant "that the standards of
identification applicable to the discovery of records in court proceedings
[are] appropriate guidelines."43 Under the Federal Rules the demandant
need only "identify the rulings with sufficient particularity so that their
extraction from the files may reasonably be made by- the employee
37 Id. at 778.
38 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1972).
39 825 F. Supp. at 135.
40 S. REP., supra note 8, at 8.
41315 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1970). Accord, Irons v. Schulyer, 465 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972) (the court remanded for a determination of whether
the commissioner should be required to make an index of all manuscripts).
42 424 F.2d at 938.
43 S. RE., supra note 8, at 2.
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responsible for them." 44 Therefore, since the agencies are privy to
greater knowledge of the contents of their files, they should promote the
flow of information by facilitating, rather than obstructing, requests for
information.
Each Agency
For the purposes of FOIA, "agency" means "each authority of the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject
to review by another agency .... -45 This section specifically excludes
the Congress 46 and the Judiciary47 but conspicuously does not exclude
the Executive. Although the President is arguably within the disclosure
mandate of the FOIA, such a confrontation is extremely unlikely be-
cause of the doctrine of Executive Privilege.48 While an in-depth
treatmnent of Executive Privilege would prove enlightening, it is beyond
the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that it is derived from sovereign
power,49 and allows the President to withhold information "in the
public interest."
44 389 F.2d at 776 (emphasis added).
45 FOIA § 551(1). See ATr'y GEN. MEMO., supra note 18, at 4.
46 FOIA § 552(c). "This section is not authority to withhold information from Con-
gress." Id.
47 FOIA § 551(1)(b). See Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968) (pre-sentence
investigation report submitted to the court held clearly not an agency record since the
FOIA does not apply to the courts).
48 Since the birth of our Republic, the controversy over the existence of an Executive
Privilege has been waged by many eminent scholars. The recent scandal in Washington
over the Watergate incident and related matters has generated much debate over the limits
of Executive Privilege. A most expansive position was expressed by the then Attorney
General Richard Kleindienst before a joint meeting of three Senate subcommittees. It was
Attorney General Kleindienst's contention that not one of the 2.5 million employees of the
Executive branch could be compelled to testify before the Legislature if the President
directed otherwise. Mr. Kleindienst also opined that if the Congress objected, it could
either impeach the President, cut off all funds, or wait for the next election. N.Y. Times,
April 11, 1973, at 1, col. 2. It is submitted that none of Mr. Kleindienst's options are viable,
and that such an unyielding position precipitates constitutional crises. Problems in this
area are essentially political and should be compromised rather than polarized. Fortunately,
this position was not adhered to when President Nixon agreed to allow members of his
staff to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Watergate.
For some historical background on the doctrine of Executive Privilege, see United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299
U.S. 804, 320-21 (196); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (1807). See gen-
erally Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on the Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (1971); Berger, Executive Privilege v. Con-
gressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 1044 (1965); Bishop, The Executive's Right of
Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957).
49 The original justification for Executive Privilege is found in the archaic principle
that the "King can do no wrong." However, in this country, the tenet of Executive Privilege,
although not mentioned in the Constitution, arose out of the separation of powers doctrine.
On the one hand, the separation of powers doctrine maintains that an essential power of
Congress is the authority to obtain information appropriate to its legislative function. See
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). On the other side of the coin is the postulate
[Vol. 47:694
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The definition of agency set forth above is not sufficiently broad to
encompass all of the governmental offices50 which the expanding Execu-
tive branch has seen fit to create. The issue of whether an agency
comes within the FOIA or is within the constitutional umbrella of
Executive Privilege arose in Soucie v. David.51 The Office of Science &
Technology52 refused to release a copy of the Garwin Report which
evaluated the government's program for the development of a super-
sonic transport (SST), claiming that it was not an agency subject to
the FOIA."3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected
this contention and held that by virtue of its independent function, the
OST is an agency and the Garwin Report is subject to the FOIA.5 4
The Seventh Circuit in a series of cases55 was faced with the issue
of whether or not a FOIA suit could be maintained when a commission
or agency is dissolved without a successor. The court held that a pending
FOIA suit, even if instituted against an existing governmental agency,
abates when the agency dissolves without a successor.
Published Rules
By the terms of sub-section (a)(1) of the FOIA, 0 each agency is
required to publish in the Federal Register regulations outlining the
that another branch of government cannot question the manner in which the President
exercises his assigned Executive powers.
SO Examples of these are the Federal Parole Board and Amtrak.
5 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52 The statutory authority for the Office of Science and Technology (OST) is as follows:
The OST was established in the Executive Office of the President by Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 2 of 1962, Pt. 1, 3 C.F.R. 879 (1959-1963 Compilation), set out follow-
ing 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 (1964), at 247-50. Section 133z-15 has been replaced by 5
US.C. § 913 (1970).
448 F.2d at 1070 n.2.
53 448 F.2d at 1071. The OST also claimed that the Garwin Report was an inter-agency
memorandum, exempt from disclosure by virtue of FOIA § 552(b)(5). See notes 161-73 and
accompanying text, infra, for treatment of the fifth exemption.
54 448 F.2d at 1073.
55 Skolnick v. Campbell, 454 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1971); Skolnick v. Kerner, 435 F.2d 694
(7th Cir. 1970); Skolnick v. Parsons, 397 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1968).
5 6FOIA § 552(a)(1).
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal
Register for the guidance of the public -(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established places
at which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed service, the members)
from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information, make
submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal
and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers,
reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law,
1973]
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procedures which the public must follow in order to obtain information
from that agency. 7 The agencies are required to publish "rules of
procedures" and "substantive rules of general applicability." Compli-
ance with this requirement is assured by the sanction that no person
shall be "adversely affected" by a matter required to be published
which is not published. 8 However, not all things are required to be
published. Because of the problem of printing too much material5 9 in
the Federal Register, the FOIA contains a provision whereby material
that is reasonably available to a class of people is incorporated by refer-
ence.
The entire provision has been severely criticized 0 because it allows
each agency to formulate its own "hidden common-law." Unfortunately,
the result has often been confusing and contradictory regulations which
frustrate the administration of the FOIA.
Sub-division (2)61 of section (a) refers to the "case law" of the
and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability for-
mulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing. Except to the ex-
tent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a-person may
not in any manner by required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter
required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published. For the pur-
pose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected
thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorVorated by refer-ence therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register.
57 Abel v. IRS, 70-2 USTC 9590 (C.D. Cal., July 10, 1970) No. 70-786-IR Civil.
58FOIA § 552(a)(1). But see Hicks v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1064 (1969) (failure to publish a personnel reduction directive did not
effect its efficacy because it was solely internal and had no general applicability).
69 S. RaPo., supra note 8, at 6; Arr'y GEN. Maao., supra note 18, at 5.
60 Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1257 (remarks by Harrison Wellford of the
Center for the Study of Responsive Law); Recommendation No. 24, The Principles and
Guidelines For Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (1971), reprinted in
Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1232; Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist and
William D. Ruckelshaus to the General Counsels of All Federal Dep'ts and Agencies, Dec.
8, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Rehnquist Memo.], reprinted in Moorhead Hearings, supra
note 13, at 1132. A comprehensive analysis of agency practices relating to the FOIA would
indicate that the establishment of uniform regulations is needed. See notes 23-26 supra for
discussion of the Subcommittee questionnaires on agency FOIA practices.
61 FOIA § 552(a)(2) provides:
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for
public inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as
orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by
the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member
of the public; unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for
sale. To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes avaliable or pub-
lishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruc-
tion. However, in each case the justification for the deletion shall be explained
fully in writing. Each agency also shall maintain and make available for public
inspection and copying a current index providing identifying information, for
the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967,
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agencies. By virtue of this section, the "case law" must be made available
for public inspection and copying. In addition to requiring that final
adjudicatory opinions and policy interpretations be made available,
subsection (a)(2)(C) extends to "administrative staff manuals . . .
that affect a member of the public"6 2 and has been the subject of
recent litigation. In Hawkes v. IRS, 63 the Sixth Gircuit undertook an
in-depth treatment of this subsection" and concluded that a manual
relating to examination of returns and the interrogation of taxpayers
by Internal Revenue Service agents was administrative in character
and clearly discloseable under FOIA § 552(a)(2)(G).
Pursuant to the statutory grant of subsection (a), many agencies
follow a procedure whereby denials of information are appealable
within the agency thereby affording themselves a defense under the
doctrine of exhaustion of remediesO5 against an action under the FOIA.
While the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has been favorably received
by the courts66 the delay such a requirement engenders is often highly
prejudicial to the demandant. Yet the courts have not held that such
and required by this paragraph to be made available or published. A final order,
opinion, statement of policy, interpretation or staff manual or instruction that
affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an
agency against a party other than an agency only if-
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided
by this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
For legislative history, see S. REP., supra note 8, at 6-7; H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 7-8;
ATr'Y GEN. MEmo., supra note 18, at 13-22.
62 However, this provision is limited in scope by the second exemption, FOIA
§ 552(b)(2) which exempts from disclosure matters "related solely to the internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency." See notes 142-48 and accompanying text infra, for treat-
ment of this second exemption.
63 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972). Accord, City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958
(N.D. Cal. 1971).
64 The court noted that the word "administrative" was not included in the original
text of the bill. The court adopted the Senate's interpretation holding that the purpose of
this addition was to exclude from public view staff manuals pertaining to law enforcement
matters but not those relating to administrative matters. 467 F.2d at 794. See S. REP., supra
note 8, at 2.
The exception for law enforcement materials ... is ... a very narrow one and is
to be applied only where the sole effect of disclosure would be to enable law viola-
tors to escape detection.
467 F.2d at 795.
65 According to the Supreme Court, a primary purpose served by exhaustion of rem-
edies is "the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process." McKart
v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). See Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys. 418 F.2d
155, 158 (7th Cir. 1969) (only after administrative process is exhausted is the judicial pro-
cess available).
66 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d
1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969); Abel
v. IRS, No. 70-786-IH Civil, (C.D. Cal., July 10, 1970). But see Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787,
792, n.6 (6th Cir. 1972) (exhaustion of the criminal discovery process is not a prerequisite
for disclosure) (dictum).
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prejudice amounts to a denial of due process.67 It should be noted that
at least one circuit has ruled that while exhaustion is required, it is
required only to a reasonable degree.68
The Court Shall Determine the Matter De Novo
Unquestionably, the most significant provision of the FOIA is
sub-section (a)(3) 69 which provides that de novo judicial review is avail-
able in all cases arising under the Act. Any person from whom infor-
mation has been withheld may initiate an action against the agency
in a federal district court by filing a complaint.70 An analysis of the
cases71 decided to date reveals that the court-enforcement provision has
been effective 72 in securing information from recalcitrant agencies. In
the areas of privileged financial information 3 and internal memo-
randa7 4 the courts have favored the public's right to know. But where
67 See Harbolt v. Alldredge, 464 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025
(1972); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Mail Line,
Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
08 Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
And the fact that the appellant might, presumably by a combination of intuition
and diligent research ferret out some of the materials relied upon is surely no rea-
son to suppose that Congress made revelation under the Freedom of Information
Act contingent upon a showing of exhaustion of one's own ingenuity.
Id. at 1342.
69 FOIA § 552(a)(3) provides:
Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this sub-section, each agency, on request for identifiable records made in ac-
cordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized
by statute, and procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available
to any person. On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district
in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in
which the agency records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records im-
properly withheld from the complaint. In such a case the court shall determine the
matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. In the event
of noncompliance with the order of the court, the district court may punish for
contempt the responsible employee, and in the case of a uniformed service, the re-
sponsible member. Except as to causes the court considers of greater importance,
proceedings before the district court, as authorized by this paragraph, take prece-
dence on the docket over all other causes and shall be assigned for hearing and
trial at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way.
70 Farrell v. Ignatius, 283 F. Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (order to show cause held not
sufficient to commence a FOIA action).
71 Unfortunately, in many instances, the prospect of expensive litigation acts to dis-
courage the private citizen. This fear is borne out by the fact that the vast majority of
FOIA cases are brought by corporations or persons seeking private benefit. Accordingly,
the public interest which was to be the primary beneficiary of the FOIA has been left to
its own designs and has come up empty. Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1255-60 (re-
marks by Harrison Wellford of the Center of the Study of Responsive Law).
72 It is interesting to note that government success in FOIA litigation is about 50%,
while it approaches 90% in other actions.
73 FOIA § 552(b)(4); see notes 154-60 and accompanying text, infra, for treatment of
the fourth exemption.
74 FOIA § 552(b)(5); see notes 161-73 and accompanying text, infra, for treatment of
the fifth exemption.
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records pertaining to national security75 and investigatory files76 are in-
volved, the courts have been more protective of agency perogatives.
For a variety of reasons administrative officials tend to be overly
protective of their respective domains.7 7 However, the FOIA was in-
tended to and has, to a certain extent, eliminated this attitude. The
basic reason for this shift in attitude is that an administrator is more
deliberate when faced with the prospect of a judicial proceeding in
which he bears the burden of justifying his refusal to disclose. In order
to promote the FOIA through accommodation rather than litigation
which is burdensome to both the demandant and the government, the
Freedom of Information Committee 8 was established within the Justice
Department.
The language of subsection (a)(3), specifically the first sentence, has
led to some uncertainty over the scope of the judicial review provision.
This awkwardly worded section can be read to exclude from judicial
review those records pertaining to rules of general applicability79 and
agency "case law."8 0
In City of Concord v. Ambrose,8s the district court in Northern
California fell prey to the ambiguity of the language in question. The
75 FOIA § 552(b)(1); see notes 109-41 and accompanying text, infra, for treatment of the
first exemption.
76 FOIA § 552(b)(7); see notes 175-86 and accompanying text, infra, for treatment of
the seventh exemption.
FOIA § 552(a)(3).
The burden of proof is placed upon the agency which is the only party able tojustify the withholding. A private citizen cannot be asked to prove that an agency
has withheld information improperly because he will not know the reasons for the
agency action.
H.R. REP'., supra note 12, at 9.
77 In a memorandum sent to the general counsels of the federal agencies, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, then head of the Office of Legal Counsel, stated:
Although the legal basis for denying a particular request under the act [FOIA]
may seem quite strong to an agency at the time it elects finally to refuse access to
the requested records, the justification may appear considerably less strong when
later viewed, in the context of adversary litigation, from the detached prospective
of a court and from the standpoint of the broad public policy of the act ... (em-
phasis added).
Rehnquist Memo., supra note 60.
78 The Freedom of Information Committee was instituted pursuant to the Rehnquist
Memo. The aim of the Committee was to promote FOIA through accommodation rather
than "litigation burdensome both to the requester and to the Government."
Through March, 1972, the Committee had received some 500 inquiries most of which
were resolved amicably, while approximately 120 resulted in "consultations" between the
agency and the Committee. Although the FOI Committee does not record precisely all of
its business, the House Committee on Government Operations recognizes "the work of the
FOI Committee in helping.. . bring about a more enlightened administration of the act
within the Federeal bureaucracy." GovERNMENT OsR'aanoNs REP., supra note 24, at 69.
79 FOIA § 552(a)(1).
80 FOIA § 552(a)(2).
81333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971). But cf. Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.
1970).
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court held that the act established mutually exclusive categories and
that the judicial review section must be construed to exclude those
records described in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).
However, this interpretation is not to be found in the legislative
history. The Senate Report,82 the House Report,8 3 and the Attorney
General's Memorandum 4 all concur in the view that judicial enforce-
ment is available to obtain those records pertaining to rules of general
applicability and agency "case law." This interpretation was adopted
by the District of Columbia Circuit in American Mail Line Ltd. v.
Gulick:8 5
[I]f the agency refuses to comply with paragraphs (1) or (2) it is
then subject to suit under the processes spelled out in para-
graph (3).8
EQUITABLE DISCRETION
The FOIA vests in the district courts the jurisdiction "to enjoin
the agency from withholding agency records." The propriety of an
agency denial is to be determined de novo by the district court in order
to prevent the judicial review provision "from becoming meaningless
judicial sanctioning of agency discretion."87 Despite the fact that the
distinction between law and equity has been abolished,88 that distinc-
tion has spawned a significant clash of authority under FOIA. The
remedy of injunction is an equitable one and a petition thereunder
may be subject to the court's intrinsic power to exercise its discretion.
The problem arises as to the extent to which a court may exercise its
equitable discretion. May the court look beyond the technical applica-
bility of the exemptions?
An examination of the statute reveals no language8 9 that requires
the courts to order disclosure unless the materials sought are specifically
exempt. The absence of any express provision making enforcement
mandatory may have been an oversight. Unfortunately, the legislative
82 S. RrP., supra note 8, at 6 & 8.
83 H.1. RP., supra note 12, at 2 & 9.
84 Arr'Y GEN. MEmo., supra note 18, at 23, 27-28.
85 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
s6 Id. at 701. Accord, Irons v. Schulyer, 465 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971). Contra, City of Concord v.
Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958, 960 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at
1204 (current interpretation held by Justice Dep't).
87 S. REP., supra note 8, at 8.
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
89 But see FOIA § 552 (c) which provides "[tlhis section does not authorize withholding
of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated
in this section." (emphasis added).
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history on this point is unclear. The House Report provides that
"[t]he Court will have authority whenever it considers such action
equitable and appropriate to enjoin the agency from withholding its
records . . . ."90 On the other hand, the Senate Report describes the
purpose of the statute as "establish[ing] a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under dearly de-
lineated statutory language .... -91 The result is that the legislative his-
tory is inconclusive.
The case law, however, presents a more definitive picture. There
have been several lower court decisions92 adopting the view that broad
equitable discretion is available under the FOIA, but to date no court
of appeals has maintained that position. At least three circuit courts
have interpreted the FOIA to preclude the application of equitable
discretion.93
90 H.RL ReP., supra note 12, at 9 (emphasis added). This view is echoed by the Attorney
General's memorandum which states "the district court is free to exercise the traditional
discretion of a court of equity in determining whether... the relief.., is equitable and
appropriate...." ATr'Y GEN. MEMO., supra note 18, at 28 (emphasis added).
91 S. 1zp., supra note 8, at 3 (emphasis added). See note 19 supra.
92 All of these cases were decided very early in the life of FOIA, which may help to
explain their position. See Long v. IRS, 389 F. Supp. 1266 (W.D. Wash. 1971) (by implica-
tion); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 01 F. Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (mem.), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971) (court held
that it must, "according to traditional equity principles, weigh the effects of disclosure and
non-disclosure and determine the best course to follow ... .'). 801 F. Supp. at 806. See
also Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Barce-
loneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
93 The District of Columbia Circuit, in Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
said, "a District Court has no equitable jurisdiction to deny disclosure on grounds other
than those laid out under one of the Act's enumerated exemptions." Id. at 678. See Soucie
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411
F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The Fourth Circuit refused to apply equitable discretion in Wellford v. Hardin, 444
F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
The Sixth Circuit adopted a similar position in Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA,
464 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1972).
It should also be noted that the position of the Ninth Circuit as to the role of judicial
discretion is somewhat clouded. In Benson v. GSA, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969), the court,
referring to the fifth exemption, stated:
In exercising the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Freedom of Information Act,
the court must weigh the effects of disclosure and nondisclosure, according to
traditional equity principles and determine the best course to follow in the given
circumstances. The effect on the public is the primary consideration.
Id. at 880.
Thus, it appears that the Ninth Circuit would apply its equitable discretion. However,
in the subsequent case of Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 965 (1970), this position was qualified to the extent that such discretion would not be
applied with respect to the first and third exemptions.
Section (b)(1) is couched in terms significantly different from the other exemptions.
Under the others (with the exception of the third) the very basis for the agency
determination - the underlying factual contention - is open to judicial review.[citations omitted]. Under (b)(1) this is not so. The function of determining
whether secrecy is required in the national interest is expressly assigned to the
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However, there is some dicta to indicate the majority will not be
tied down if "special circumstances [arise] which can properly be
argued as overriding the statutory mandates." 94 By not foreclosing the
application of judicial discretion in exceptional instances, the door to
future development was left ajar. This threshold was crossed in the
recent case of Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd.95
There, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed a district court decision enjoining agency proceedings pending
judicial determination of the applicability of the FOIA to certain docu-
ments relevant to those proceedings.96 The agency contested the pro-
priety of the preliminary injunction claiming (1) the FOIA does not
empower the district court to enjoin agency proceedings, and (2) even
if it did, the plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies.9"
The court justified this extension of the FOIA on two grounds.
First, the legislative intent revealed that one of the abuses FOIA was
designed to eliminate was the dilemma of those confronted with secret
laws or incomplete data in administrative proceedings.9 The court
bolstered its position by analogizing to a subsidiary provision of the
Act, i.e., that agency material may not be used against a party if it has
not been made available to him.99 Secondly, the court invoked its
equitable powers to prevent injustice and avoid irreparable injury.100
The court claimed that the application of equitable principles in
Bannercraft was consistent with the denial of equitable power to circum-
vent the technical applicability of the exemptions. While the courts
have interpreted Congressional intent to preclude consideration of
matters apart from the specific exemptions of the Act itself,101 it hardly
follows that Congress intended to prevent the use of equitable means to
effectuate the policy of the statute. As Judge Skelly Wright stated:
executive. The judicial inquiry is limited to the question whether an appropriate
executive order has been made as to the material in question.
421 F.2d at 933.
94 464 F.2d at 662. "There may be exceptional circumstances [invoking the] operation
of limited judicial discretion ...." 448 F.2d at 1077.
95 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1973)
(No. 72-822).
96 466 F.2d at 349.
97 466 F.2d at 348-49.
98 466 F.2d at 351. See S. REP., supra note 8, at 7. "This change will prevent a citizen
from losing a controversy with an agency because of some obscure and hidden order or
opinion which the agency knows about but which has been unavailable to the citizen sim-
ply because he had no way in which to discover it." Id. See also H.R. REP., supra note 12,
at 8.
99 FOIA § 552(a)(2). See also FOIA § 552(a)(3) which provides that FOIA proceedings
are to "take precedence on the docket over all other causes."
100 466 F.2d at 356.
101 See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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It is one thing to say that Congress has decided for itself which
kinds of documents should be disclosed, leaving little if any discre-
tion for the courts. It is quite another to suggest that Congress has
deliberately withheld the tools necessary for courts to implement
its substantive decisions.1 02
Judge MacKinnon dissented vigorously, claiming that "[T]he appellees
'need for judicial intervention' is wholly irrelevant to determination of
the jurisdiction of the District Courts in these cases."'103 He maintained
that the FOIA empowers the court to issue injunctive relief on narrow,
specific grounds and that these remedies are "exclusive."'10 4
Although there is some support for the position taken in Banner-
craft,105 it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will uphold this decision
in its entirety. Recently, in EPA v. Mink'0 the Supreme Court adopted
a strict construction of the FOIA; it limited the application of the Act
to what is expressly provided and not "what congress would have pro-
vided." The Court stated:
Moreover, in actions under the Freedom of Information Act, courts
are not given the option to impose alternative sanctions . . . .107
Accordingly, an extension of judicial authority without specific Con-
gressional sanction would appear to be beyond the scope of the FOIA. 08
THE EXEMPtiONS
Section b(l): [Matters] Specifically Required by Executive Order to
Be Kept Secret in the Interest of the National Defense of Foreign Policy.
While all of the exemptions represent a tacit concession to Execu-
102 466 F.2d at 354. See also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); L. JA=F,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIV ACrMON 426 (1965).
103 466 F.2d at 362.
104 Id.
105 Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
Where a request for a temporary injunction of a rulemaking proceeding was deemed not
ripe for adjudication inasmuch as no showing of irreparable injury had been made, Chief
Judge Bazelon wrote "[i]f there is substantial delay in determining appellant's right to
disclosure, or in achieving such disclosure as the statute requires, the District Court may
consider the propriety of granting temporary relief." Id. at 940 (dictum). See Steadman
Security Corp. v. SEC, 41 U.S.L.W. 2405 (Feb. 6, 1973) (dictum). But see Hawkes v. IRS, 467
F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
108 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
107Id. at 86 n.13.
108 Another factor militating against an affirmance of Bannercraft is the private nature
of the interest asserted. The Supreme Court in Mink emphasized the judicially enforceable
right of the public to secure information. These factors, coupled with the potential mis-
application of FOIA as a vehicle for obstruction of administrative processes, indicate a
Supreme Court narrowing of the holding to its facts because of the nature of the renego-
tiation process and the inability of the lower court to afford the necessary relief, or, a
reversal of the Bannercraft decision.
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tive Privilege, nowhere is this more vividly apparent than in the first
exemption."° The Freedom of Information Act rejected the broad,
almost insurmountable standard established by the APA.11 By elimi-
nating the "public interest" standard, the FOIA attempted to "delimit
more narrowly the exception and give it a more precise definition.""'
The new standard authorizes the withholding of documents classified
by Executive Order as "secret." Attorney General Ramsey Clark ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the arbitrariness tolerated by this new
standard.112 He cautioned that Executive Orders "should define as
precisely as is feasible the categories of matters to be exempted.""'1 3
The courts were called upon to determine the scope of the "secret
matter" exemption in several cases involving dramatic national issues. 114
Does the word "specifically" mean that the document in question be
the subject of a specific Executive Order, or is Executive Order 10501,115
establishing a system of classification, a sufficient basis upon which to
claim the exemption? If no specific order is necessary, is the district
court empowered to ascertain the propriety of a security classification?
109 The FOIA gives "full recognition to the fact that the President must at times act
in secret in the exercise of his constitutional duties .... " 112 CONG. REc. 13,022, June 20,
1966 (remarks of Congressman Dole). The FOIA is "not intended to impinge upon the
appropriate power of the Executive . 112 CONG. RFc. 13,008, June 20, 1966. (remarks
of Congressman Moss).
110 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. § 3(a)(1). This section au-
thorized the withholding of documents where "secrecy in the public interest" was required.
The inadequacies of this provision were summarized as follows: "Rather than protecting
the public's interest, it has caused widespread public dissatisfaction and confusion." S.
REP., supra note 8, at 8.
111 Id.
112 Arr'x GEN. MmO., supra note 18, at 30.
113 Id.
114 Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (reports prepared on Cannikin, nuclear
underground test); Soude v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (disclosure of the Garwin
Report, a report on the SST compiled on Presidential request); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d
930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (Operation Keelhaul, documents relating to
the repatriation of Soviet citizens after the Second World War).
115 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-1953 Comp.), as amended, 3 C.F.R. 292 (1971), 50 U.S.C. § 401
(1970). This Executive Order establishing new classification guidelines, was issued in 1953
by President Eisenhower. However, this order was susceptible to great abuse and by 1972
it was conservatively estimated that over 20 million documents were improperly classified.
Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1032 (remarks of Congressman Horton).
In March, 1972, President Nixon purported to eliminate the evils inherent in the
classification system by issuing Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973) [hereinafter
Executive Order]. Although President Nixon's accompanying statement appeared very
promising, Representative Moorhead after a preliminary study stated that "the Executive
order itself does not live up to the laudable goals contained in the President's statement."
Moorhead Hearings, supra note 13, at 1174.
This topic has been the subject of much debate and reflects another aspect of the prob-
lem of insuring the free flow of information. See generally Note, The National Security




In Epstein v. Resor,"6 the Ninth Circuit adopted a broad interpre-
tation of the first exemption. The controversy arose when the Army
denied Epstein access to certain historical documents. When a FOIA
suit was instituted, the district court granted the Army's motion for
summary judgment. That court claimed that the power to decide the
issue de novo was limited to "whether classifications within the first
exemption [are] clearly arbitrary and unsupportable. '1 1 7 This reasoning
was affirmed by the court of appeals which stated: "[T]he judiciary
has neither the 'aptitude, facilities nor responsibility' to review these
essentially political decisions." ' s The court further held that judicial
inquiry into the arbitrariness of the agency classification did not call
for in camera examination 9 in this case because the file was undergoing
a paper-by-paper re-evaluation.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia veered from
this broad reading of the first exemption in Soucie v. David.uo There,
the government denied disclosure of the Garwin Report (evaluation
of SST program compiled at Presidential request). The point of con-
flict was whether the Garwin Report was subject to the FOIA. The
court found that it was and remanded the case for determination of
whether any exemption applied. Its instruction as to the first exemp-
tion was that "[t]he court can most effectively undertake the statutory
de novo evaluation of the Government's claim by examining the Report
in camera.' 2 1 This language set the stage for the D.C. Circuit in the
Mink case.
The controversy crystallized in Mink v. EPA122 when petitioners
brought a suit under the FOIA to compel disclosure of nine docu-
ments pertaining to underground nuclear tests to be conducted on
Amchitka Island.128 The agency's motion for summary judgment was
granted on the basis of the FOIA exemptions for "national defense"
and "intra-agency" memoranda. The circuit court reversed, concluding
that the first exemption permits nondisclosure of only secret portions
of classified documents but requires disclosure of the nonsecret com-
116 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
" Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214, 217 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 920 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 898 U.S. 965 (1970).
118421 F.2d at 933; cf. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
119 421 F.2d at 933.
120 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
121 Id. at 1079.
122 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
123 A separate action to enjoin the nuclear experiment was brought in district court.
The issue ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which denied, without opinion, the
petitioners' application for an injunction. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Schlesinger, 404 U.S, 917 (1971).
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ponents if separable . 2 4 The action was remanded with instructions to
the district court to conduct an in camera inspection. The purpose of
this inspection was to sort out the nonsecret portions which could be
disclosed without compromising the secret documents that the FOIA
intended to protect. 125 The Mink case presented the Court with the
opportunity to illuminate the meaning of two major exemptions of the
FOIA.128 The respondents defended the circuit court's decision with
three assertions: (1) the word "specifically" in the statute is to be strictly
construed and requires an Executive Order specifically directing the
classification, 27 (2) only those documents properly classified secret are
exempt and those separable, unclassified components are subject to
disclosure, and (3) the district court was authorized to determine which
documents were improperly classified by means of in camera inspection.
By a 5-3128 majority, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held
that the de novo judicial review provision did not authorize the district
court to order production of the records or to conduct in camera
inspection to sift out "nonsecret components.' 29 Further, the scope of
review is limited to the issue of whether or not the President has re-
quired by Executive Order that the documents in question are to be
kept secret. This determination was based on both a literal reading of
the statute and an analysis of the legislative history 30 In the words of
Mr. Justice White:
The language of the Act itself is sufficiently clear in this respect,
but the legislative history disposes of any possible argument that
Congress intended the Freedom of Information Act to subject
124 464 F.2d at 746.
125 Id. at 746. The distinction between facts and policy is applied to matters under
the fifth exemption.
128 Exemption one, protecting records of national security, and exemption five, per-
taining to inter-agency memoranda. FOIA § 552(b)(1) & (5). See notes 161-73 and accompany-
ing text, infra, for analysis of the fifth exemption.
127 Although the House Report indicates that the President must determine that
the exempted matter be kept secret, [H.R. RE., supra note 12, at 10], the respon-
dents do not assert this position because such a requirement would place an undue
burden upon the office of the President. The respondents do assert however, that
general Executive order does not qualify for exemption under one but rather "once
a specific request for disclosure . . . is made under the Act, a refusal to release
•.. can be justified only when the President issues a specific order that the matter
is privileged under the (b)(1) exemption.
Brief for A.C.L.U. as Amicus Curiae at 19.
128 The majority consisted of White, J., who delivered the opinion of the Court, joined
by Burger, C.J. and Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ.
129 410 U.s. at 85.
138 Id. at 81-83. But see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Marshall which states: "The Court's reliance on isolated references to Executive Order
10501 in the Congressional proceedings is erroneous and misleading." Id. at 101.
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executive security classifications to judidal review at the insistence
of anyone who might seek to question them. 31
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress had specifically chosen
to defer such matters to executive judgment and "that choice must be
honored." The Court also concluded that the agency could satisfy its
burden of proof by establishing that the records would not have been
subject to subpoena in ordinary civil litigation. Thus, the allegations
contained in the agency's affidavit submitted in support of its original
motion for summary judgment were deemed sufficient'3 2 to invoke the
first exemption.
Dissenting Justice Brennan asserted that the majority misconceived
the holding of the court of appeals. 3 3 He was of the view that the
presence of derivative classifications' 34 mandates the examination of
the documents in camera in order to separate and release the non-
classified components. 3 5 Finally, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that
the decision of the Court reduces the judicial role to "meaningless
judicial sanction of agency discretion."' 3 6
In a separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that:
"The majority makes the stamp sacrosanct, thereby immunizing
stamped documents from judicial scrutiny . . . ,,'1' He also argued
that the majority had distorted and misconceived the judicial function.
Specifically, the role of the district court should be "to determine
whether nonsecret material was a mere appendage to a 'secret' or 'top
secret' file."' 33 Mr. Justice Douglas concluded that the Court has made
a "shambles" of the FOIA by disrupting the "workable formula"'3 9
established in the legislative scheme.
131 Id. at 82.
.32 But see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176, 1180 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Frankel v. SEC. 336 F. Supp. 675, 677 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cowles Communications,
Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1971). In these cases the courts have
not allowed the executive to merely submit an affidavit and by so doing foreclose any other
determination of fact. See also, Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
133 410 U.S. at 99.
134 "A document [or file] . . . shall bear a dassification at least as high as that of its
highest classified component." Executive Order, supra note 115, § 3(c). See generally Na.
tional Security Interest, note 115 supra.
135 The position taken by Mr. Justice Brennan finds support in three areas: (1) a broad
interpretation of the judicial review provision, (2) a consideration of the legislative history
in light of the statutory purposes, see Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971), and (3) the recognition of the FOIA
in Executive Order 11,652.
-36 S. REP., supra note 8, at 8; H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 9.
137 410 US. at 108.
138 Id. at 109.
139 Id. at 109-10; S. REP., supra note 8, at 3.
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In sum, the decision in Mink' 40 represents the Court's first evalua-
tion of the FOIA and may be interpreted on two levels. First, the first
exemption precludes the compelled disclosure of classified documents
and in camera inspection to sift out nonsecret components. Second, the
Court clearly challenges the Congress to promulgate forceful, concise
legislation or else be burdened with an ineffectual statute. The Court's
impatience with Congressional inconsistencies was clearly expressed:
"Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch
adopt new procedures or it could have established its own procedures
-subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be
held to impose upon such congressional ordering."'41 The decision in
Mink contrasts a growing hostility between the Executive and the
Legislature with the Judiciary's inclination to remain neutral.
Section (b)(2): [Matters] Related Solely to the Internal Personnel Rules
and Practices of an Agency.
This section was included in the Act in order to provide some
shelter for the internal personnel rules and practices of the agencies.
The extension of subsection (a)(2)(C) to include administrative man-
uals' 42 necessitated a provision to protect agency privacy with respect
to its internal affairs. Unfortunately, the Senate and House Reports are
diametrically opposed. The Senate characterized this exemption as
relating to "rules as to personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation
of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave and the like."'143
On the other hand, the House interpreted this exemption to mean that
"operating rules, guidelines and manuals of procedure for Government
investigators or examiners would be exempt from disclosure but ...
not . . . employee relations and working conditions and routine ad-
ministrative procedures .... 144
The interpretation of the House has been adopted by the Second
140 Some doubt as to the force of the majority opinion is generated by the cynical
tone of Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion. For example, he conceded that without
this type of information "the people and their representatives [are] reduced to a state of
ignorance [and] the democratic process is paralyzed." 410 U.S. at 95. Nevertheless, he con-
cluded that Congress enacted the FOIA without the means to question an Executive de-
termination that a document is "secret." And, by virtue of exemption one, Congress has
chosen "blind acceptance of Executive fiat," regardless of "however cynical, myopic, or
even corrupt" that Executive decision may be. Id. This language is exceptionally harsh and
it is submitted that in future FOIA cases the stance of Mr. Justice Stewart as the deciding
vote deserves close watching.
'41 410 U.S. 83 (emphasis added).
142 See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
143 S. REP., supra note 8, at 8.
144 H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 10 (emphasis added).
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Circuit, 4 5 while the Senate interpretation has been adopted by the
Sixth'46 and Ninth147 Circuits. It is submitted that the better view is
that of the Senate, based on the plain import of the statute's language
and interpretation of the legislative history.14
Section (b)(3): [Matters] Specifically Exempted From Disclosure by
Statute.
This section echoes the language of the first exemption' 49 and was
included in order to foreclose any claims that the FOIA invalidated
the "nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public access
to specific Government records."'150 The scope of the third exemption
has been the subject of several recent district court decisions involving
the Social Security Act.151 The problem revolves around a provision
which empowers the HEW Secretary to determine whether information
obtained by the agency shall be made public. The method of inquiry
was bifocal; whether such a provision amounts to a specific exemption
by statute as required by the third exemption and, if so, whether the
provision itself was applicable to the information sought. Two district
courts' 52 have held that certain HEW annual reports are subject to
disclosure notwithstanding the third exemption while on the identical
question one district court 153 has refused to disclose. The latter view is
145 Polymers, Inc. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 101O
(1970); see Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972); City of Concord v. Ambrose,
333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dictum).
146 Haukes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
147 GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); accord, Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp.
1371 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
148 "[T]he Senate interpretation was before the House when it voted to approve sub-
section (b)(2) in exactly the same form as had passed the Senate earlier. To adopt the statu-
tory interpretation put forward in the House Report would be to allow a single house of
the Congress to effectively alter the meaning placed on proposed legislation by the other
house without altering a word of the text." 467 F.2d at 797.
149 Here, too, "the only matter to be determined in a district court's de novo inquiry
is the factual existence of such a statute, regardless of how unwise, self-protective or in-
advertent the enactment might be." 410 U.S. at 95 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring).
150 H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 10; Ar'Y GEN. Mmao., supra note 18, at 31. The case
of Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972) is a recent case invoking this
exemption and presents an interesting issue relating to the standing of a taxpayer to de-
mand an accounting from the Government in regard to money expended by the CIA.
15142 U.S.C. § 1805 et seq. (1970).
152 Schecter v. Richardson, 41 U.S.L.W. 2366 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1973); Serchuk v. Rich-
ardson, 41 U.S.L.W. 2366 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 1973).
153 California v. Richardson, 851 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Davis, supra
note 10, at 786-87, where Professor Davis rejects the argument that the Commission, not
the statute, is exempting the information. Professor Davis maintains that to hold otherwise
would be to defeat the intent of the enabling statute which may well be more specific than
the Information Act.
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in contravention of the liberal disclosure mandate of the FOIA and
these apparent conflicts between the statutes can be obviated by empha-
sizing the word "specifically." It is submitted that the provision leaving
disclosure to the discretion of the Secretary is not specific within the
context of the third exemption.
Section (b)(4):[Matters] Trade Secrets and Commercial or Financial
Information Obtained From any Person and Privileged or Confidential.
The right of the Government to withhold information that it
obtains from "any person"' 54 but which would not ordinarily be re-
leased by that person to the public is protected by this exemption.
With minor deviations, the Senate1 5 and House 56 Reports run parallel.
Unfortunately, poor draftsmanship has subjected the fourth exemption
to conflicting interpretations. 157 Some courts read it to deny disclosure
of documents which are confidential but not commercial or financial
in nature' 58 while others have held that this exemption applies when
the information is either privileged or confidential and commercial
or financial. 59 The Attorney General's memorandum contributes to
the confusion when it says: "It seems obvious . . . that Congress
neither intended to exempt all commercial and financial information
on the one hand, nor to require disclosure of all other privileged or
confidential information on the other."'' 0 Since what Congress did
intend is not obvious, the meaning of the fourth exemption shall
remain elusive until the courts or Congress can provide a definitive
answer.
Section (b)(5): [Matters] Inter-Agency or Intra-Agency Memorandums
or Letters Which Would Not Be Available by Law to a Party Other
Than an Agency in Litigation With the Agency.
The legislative history of this exemption reveals that it was designed
to protect certain internal communications. This section was included
154 This phrase may include information from the public at large, a particular person,
or a private institution. Included in the exempted material is information from within
an agency. Arr'Y GEN. MEMO., supra note 18, at 34. But see Consumers Union v. Veteran's
Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), which requires that the information
be obtained from outside the agency.
155 S. REP., supra note 8, at 9.
156 H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 10.
157 See ATr'Y GEN. MEMO., supra note 18, at 32.
158 Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1969); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
159 Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Consumers Union v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
260 ATr'Y GEN. MEMO., supra note 18, at 34.
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in response to agency contentions that premature disclosure of policy
considerations would inhibit meaningful discourse. "They contended
... that advice from staff assistants and the exchange of ideas among
agency personnel would not be completely frank if they were forced to
'operate in a fishbowl.' ,,16
The precise meaning of this exemption has revolved around two
areas: (1) the distinction betwen factual matters and those involving
decision-making processes and (2) the effect of the incorporation of a
discovery standard.
The courts have unanimously accepted the distinction between
fact and policy and demanded the disclosure of those materials relating
to factual material while permitting the withholding of material related
to decision-making. Some difficulty has arisen as to matters that are
mixed treatments of fact and opinion. However, this problem was dis-
pensed with in Soucie v. David,0 2 where the exemption was interpreted
to mean that disclosure is compelled only when such factual material
is not "inextricably intertwined with policy-making processes." 103 The
court further held that this determination could be most effectively
accomplished by in camera inspection in the district court.
This approach was re-asserted by the D.C. Circuit in Mink v.
EPA. 14 There, the court remanded the action ordering an in camera
inspection of documents to determine the factual data which was not
"inextricably intertwined with policymaking processes" and that could
be safely disclosed "without impinging on the policy-making decisional
processes intended to be protected by the exemption ....u"165
On review by the Supreme Court, this decision was remanded. 16
The Court, while adopting the distinction between purely factual
matters and materials reflecting deliberative processes, 167 took issue
with "the unmistakable implication" that the fifth exemption mandates
in camera inspection in all instances.168 It viewed this position as "un-
161 H.R. Rn'., supra note 12, at 10. See also S. REP., supra note 8, at 9; Arr'VY GEN.
MEMO., supra note 18, at 54. This opinion was also expressed by President Johnson: "Offi-
cials within the Government must be able to communicate with one another fully and
frankly without publicity." Johnson Statement, supra note 21.
162 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
163 Id. at 1078.
164 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
165 Id. at 747.
100 410 U.S. 73 (1973). Seven Justices concurred in this aspect of the decision, with only
Justice Douglas dissenting.
167 410 U.S. at 91. The Court said that the question at issue was whether the disclosure
would be "injurious to the consultative functions of government." Id. at 87. See United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
16 410 U.S. at 92.
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necessarily rigid." The Court postulated a flexible, common-sense ap-
proach whereby: (1) in camera inspection is acknowledged as a useful
device but it need not be automatic,1 9 and (2) the agency should be
afforded the opportunity to satisfy its burden by means of detailed
affidavits or oral testimony.170 Only when these alternate means have
failed to satisfy the burden should in camera examination be warranted.
The Mink decision also clarified the meaning of the qualifying
clause that incorporates the civil discovery standard, i.e., matters which
"would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litiga-
tion with the agency."' 71 Several courts have treated this qualifying
clause as necessitating a consideration of the need of the demandant
because such inquiry is made under ordinary discovery rules.17 2 Relying
on the underlying policy of the FOIA, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected this contention. The Mink decision states, "[n]or does the Act,
by its terms, permit inquiry into particularized needs of the individual
seeking the information, although such an inquiry would ordinarily be
made of a private litigant.' 1 73 In sum, the operation of the fifth exemp-
tion has been clearly delineated by the court in Mink thereby facilitat-
ing its application in the future.
Section (b)(6): [Matters] Personnel and Medical Files and Similar
Files, the Disclosure of Which Would Constitute a Clearly Unwar-
ranted Invasion of Personal Privacy.
This provision complements the thrust of the fourth exemption
and clearly indicates the operation of the FOIA as a shield for the indi-
vidual. The Senate Report provides:
The phrase 'dearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy'
enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of interests be-
tween the protection of an individual's private affairs from un-
169 Id. at 93.
170 Id.
171 FOIA § 552(b)(5). The House Report interprets this phrase to mean, "any internal
memorandums which would routinely be disclosed . . . in litigation . H. R. RP.,
supra note 12, at 10 (emphasis added).
The argument that the word "routinely" means that the agency would release them
as a matter of course has been raised several times. However, this argument has been uni-
formly rejected. The prevailing interpretation is that inter-agency memos are subject to
disclosure if a court would routinely order them produced, Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC,
450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Consumers Union v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F. Supp.
796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
172 See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft
Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Shakespeare Co. v. United
States, 389 F.2d 772 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Consumers Union v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F.
Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Benson v. GSA, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). See also notes 27-33
and accompanying text, supra, relating to the "any person" provision.
173 410 Us. at 86.
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necessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's
right to governmental information. 74
Inasmuch as the sixth exemption specifically requires balancing, it is
unique and expresses the FOIA's policy of protecting individual privacy.
Section (b)(7): [Matters] Investigatory Files Compiled for Law En-
forcement Purposes Except to the Extent Available By Law to a Party
Other Than an Agency.
The seventh exemption was included in the FOIA in order to
prevent premature access to the Government's investigatory files. 175
Precisely which files may be exempted under this provision is unclear.
The Senate Report applies it only to files prepared to "prosecute law
violators."'176 A broader definition is espoused by the House Report;
the seventh exemption includes those "files related to enforcement of
all kinds of laws, labor and securities laws [including] . . . adjudica-
tive proceedings."'177 Although few courts have spoken on this matter,
the Fifth Circuit has specifically adopted the rule that this exemption
is not limited to criminal law enforcement, but extends to law en-
forcement activities of all natures. 78
A significant controversy exists on the issue of whether the seventh
exemption ceases when law enforcement proceedings terminate. 179 Those
who favor the disclosure of investigatory files upon termination of the
investigation and enforcement proceedings argue that the agencies
should not be permitted to rely on the initial classification of a file to
authorize the unwarranted withholding of information ad infinitum.
The controversy is one of considerable import and has resulted in a
conflict among circuits and district courts. The Court of Appeals for
174S. REP., supra note 8, at 9. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969).
1755. REP., supra note 8, at 9; H.R. REp., supra note 12, at 11; ATr'Y GEN. MIEo.,
supra note 18, at 38. See Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Another reason
for this exemption is to encourage informants by refusing to disclose their identity. The
"informer's privilege" is a product of the Government's evidentiary privilege and is not
dependent upon the FOIA. See PIoposED FED. R. oF EvID. 510. The concept of informer's
privilege, however, has been abused in several instances in FOIA cases. See Commercial
Envelope Mfg. Co. v. SEC, 450 FR2d 342 (2d Cir. 1971); Evans v. Department of Transp.,
446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Clement Bros., 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969); Barce-
loneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). In these cases the courts have
denied relief because the petitioners failed to establish sufficient need.
176 S. REP., supra note 8, at 9.
177 H.1 REP., supra note 12, at 11; ATr'y GEN. Mmio., supra note 18, at 38.
178 NLR.B v. Clement Bros., 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969).
179 This question was considered by the draftsmen of the FOIA. The initial version of
the FOIA provided that the exemption for investigatory files was limited by the provision
that they would be privileged "until they were [used] and/or effect[ed] an action or pro-
ceeding or a private party's effective participation therein." S. REP. No. 1666, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964).
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the District of Columbia 80 and a district court in the Third Circuit'81
have adopted the position that an agency must disclose its files upon
termination of enforcement proceedings. The Second Circuit 8 2 and a
district court in the Ninth Circuit, 83 on the other hand, have held
that the material remains exempt even after the proceedings are con-
cluded.
It should be noted that the seventh exemption is qualified by
language very similar to the language found in exemption number five,
i.e., "except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency."'1 4 In several cases' 85 there is dicta to the effect that the peti-
tioner must establish a degree of need. By drawing a parallel to the
Court's treatment of this aspect of the fifth exemption, it appears that the
Mink decision, 86 discussed above, would foreclose any examination
into the particular need of the petitioner when dealing with the seventh
exemption.
Section (b)(8): [Matters] Contained in or Related to Examination, Op-
erating, or Condition Reports Prepared by, on Behalf of, or for the
Use of Any Agency Responsible for the Regulation or Supervision of
Financial Institutions.
The meaning of this exemption is self-evident. 87 This provision
complements the fourth exemption and emphasizes the intention of
protecting information concerning financial institutions.
180 Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
The court remanded the action to the district court to determine whether there was a
realistic prospect of continued enforcement proceedings. "[T]he agency cannot, consistent
with the broad disclosure mandate of the Act, protect all its files with the label 'investiga-
tory' and a suggestion that enforcement proceedings may be launched at some unspecified
future date." Id. at 939. See also Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
l1s Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968), where
the court held that the exemption for investigatory files applied to files relating to a con-
templated lawsuit or enforcement proceedings. See also Katz, The Games Bureaucrats
Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAs L. Ray. 1261 (1970):
"Once litigation is concluded, disclosure is impliedly required." Id. at 1279.
182 Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972), where the
court denied access to investigatory files of matters which had resulted in a consent decree.
See Second Circuit Note, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. RiEv. at 223, (1972).
183 Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal.
1971) where the court held that so long as a file is compiled for enforcement purposes, it
need not be produced when law enforcement ceases.
184 FOIA § 552(b)(7).
185 Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Del. 1972); Benson v. United States, 309
F. Supp. 1144 (D. Neb. 1970); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
186 See notes 171-73 and accompanying text supra.
187S. REP., supra note 8, at 9; H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 11; ATr'Y GEN. MEMo.,
supra note 18, at 38. Exemption eight is "designed to insure the security and integrity of
financial institutions, for the sensitive details collected by Government agencies ... could,
if indiscriminately disclosed, cause great harm." H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 11.
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Section (b)(9): [Matters] Geological and Geophysical Information and
Date (Including Maps) Concerning Wells.
This exemption was added because the Congress felt that the dis-
closure of seismic and other exploratory reports would "give speculators
an unfair advantage over the companies which spent millions of dollars
in exploration."'u8
CONCLUSION
The Freedom of Information Act is the embodiment of the first
principle that the Government is the steward of the people and public
records are the property of the people. This concept was articulated by
President Johnson when he signed the FOIA into law:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles:
a democracy works best when the people have all the information
that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to
pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public interest.... ,18 9
The Act attempts to provide a workable balance among the people's
right to know, the Government's right to a degree of confidentiality
and the individual's right to privacy. In light of the all-inclusive objec-
tive, it is no wonder that the statutory scheme is replete with inconsis-
tencies and ambiguities.
The task of mediating these diverse interests resides with the district
courts. Although the Act has been interpreted with disclosure as the
guiding star, the courts have tended to be protective where the Govern-
ment's interest is more compelling, i.e., matters relating to national
defense and investigatory files. In general, the district courts have
succeeded in effectuating a workable balance and as the body of case
law grows the applicability of the FOIA will be further refined.
The decision in Mink'90 is extremely significant because it clari-
fies several important provisions of the FOIA. Moreover, in Mink the
Court emphasizes the belief that the responsibility for insuring the
public's right to know lies not only with the courts, but, to a great
extent resides with the Congress. Thus, the Court challenged Congress
to indicate a firm commitment to the idea of free information by pro-
viding a clearly delineated statute. The manner in which Congress
188 H.R. REP., supra note 12, at 11; S. REP., supra note 8, at 9; ATr'Y GEN. MEmo.,
supra note 18, at 39.
189 Johnson Statement, supra note 21,
190 410 U.S. 73 (1978).
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responds will be of great interest.'0 ' The Bannercraft192 case will
provide the Court with a further opportunity to construe the FOIA
and may further clarify the inconsistencies of the Act.
However, the most overwhelming impression that must emerge
from studying the FOIA is a recognition that the Legislative, Executive
and Judicial branches of Government must imbue in thbmselves and
the agencies the general philosophy that the people must know how
the government is discharging its duty as the steward of the people.
Frank Amoroso
191 The Nixon Administration recently proposed a new criminal code which provides
that "a person is guilty of an offense if he knowingly communicates information relating
to the national defense to a person not authorized to receive it." New York Times, April
22, 1973, at 18, col. 1. Under the present law the information must be such as to cause
injury to the United States, and the validity of a security classification can be challenged.
The proposed code precludes any questioning of the classification, thereby representing a
codification of the Mink decision. This provision has been severely criticized by leading
members of Congress and its passage is doubtful. New York Times, April 22, 1973, at 18,
col. 1.
Thus, it appears that Congress is prepared to answer the challenge issued by the Mink
Court with equal vigor.
192 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3409, No. 72-822 (U.S. Jan.
23, 1973).
